Акопян Заруи Рафиковна Проблемы эволюции сетевых структур и распределение информации в динамических моделях популизма и конфликтов

Краткое описание

Акопян Заруи Рафиковна Проблемы эволюции сетевых структур и распределение информации в динамических моделях популизма и конфликтов
ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ ДИССЕРТАЦИИ
кандидат наук Акопян Заруи Рафиковна
Table of contents

0 Introduction

1. Symmetric Markovian Games of Commons with Potentially Sustainable Endogenous

Growth

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Statement of the Problem

1.3 Exploiting Properties of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation

1.3.1 Characterizing the Inverse of the Value Function of a Single Player in a Symmetric MPNE When A = p

1.3.2 The Role of the Integration Constant ! When A = p: Examining or Eliminating Multiple MPNEs

1.4 An Explicit Solution for the Case with Integration Constant ! =

1.4.1 Case 1: A = p

1.4.2 Case 2: A = p

1.5 Analytic Utility Functions

1.5.1 Usefulness of Analyticity for Interior Solutions

1.5.2 Analyticity and Extensions to Corner Solutions Through Homotopy Approaches

1.6 Examples with Closed-Form Solutions 25 1.6.1 Gorman Preferences

1.6.1.1 Special Case: CRRA Preferences (x = 0)

1.6.2 Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) Preferences

1.6.3 Quadratic Preferences

1.6.4 New Example with Nonlinear Exploitation Strategy: Demonstrating our Method

1.7. Conclusion

1.8. Appendix

2. Populism and Polarization in Social Media Without Fake News: the Vicious Circle of Biases, Beliefs and Network Homophily

2.1 Introduction 52 2.1.1. Related literature

2.2 Model

2.2.1 Signals and Information Structure

2.2.2 Belief sophistication, evolutionary myopia and taking optimal actions

2.2.3 Myopic search and matching equilibrium: the evolution of the network

2.2.3.1 Sending invitations

2.2.3.2 Causing annoyances

2.2.3.3 First stage of decision-making: examining received invitations and experienced annoyances

2.2.3.4 Second stage of decision-making: treating simultaneous invitations and simultaneous annoyances

2.3.1 Why the network structure affects strategies: higher order beliefs

2.3.2 The tradeoff between biases and expert opinion

2.4 Simulation Experiment

2.4.1 The role of fundamental biases

2.4.2 The role of asymmetry in the size of different groups

2.4.3 Stability of results and different speed

2.5 Conclusion

2.6 Appendix

2.6.1 Calculating key expectations

2.6.2 Calculating the value functions

3. Can a social planner manipulate network dynamics and solve coordination

problems?

3.1 Introduction

i. Related literature

3.2 Model 100 3.2.1 Signals and Information Structure

3.3 Linear Equilibrium, fixed-point strategies and evolutionary myopia

3.4 Network formation process 109 3.4.1 First stage of decision making: Sampling process

3.4.1.1 Social planner manipulation of network dynamics

3.4.1.2 Uniformly Random Sampling

3.4.1.3 Biased Sampling

3.4.2 Second stage of decision making: creating/deleting the links

3.5 Simulation experiments

3.5.1 Social planner with perfect knowledge about state variable Qt

3.5.1.1 Comparative dynamics and social welfare

3.5.1.2 Analyzing the connection between node degree and social welfare

3.5.2 Social planner with incomplete information about state variable Qt

3.5.2.1 Social planner with incomplete information

3.5.2.2 Social planner with wrong expectations

3.6 Conclusion

3.7 Appendix

3.7.1 Expectation of the state of the world

3.7.2 More detail examples: 6 Agents case

3.7.3 Generalizing The Solution in Matrix Form

3.7.4 Calculating the value functions

3.7.5 Proof of static-game result

4. Conclusion

References